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INTRODUCTION
In 1976, an estimated 1.17 million people were barred from voting
due to a criminal conviction.1 By the night of the 2016 presidential election,
that number had increased to 6.1 million.2 While many states liberalized their
voting laws in favor of restoring voting rights to convicted persons between
1996 and 2008, the years after saw some legislative backlash, with some
states returning to more restrictive criminal disenfranchisement3 laws.4
Today, even though sixteen states and the District of Columbia either allow
people to continue voting while in prison or automatically restore voting
rights upon release,5 more people than ever are barred from voting due to a
criminal conviction.6 In addition, criminal disenfranchisement laws have
recently gained renewed public attention, particularly with the passage of
Amendment 4 in Florida and the resulting pushback from the Florida
legislature,7 as well as the inclusion of questions about voting rights in the
2020 presidential race.8
Criminal disenfranchisement has a complicated history.9 The various
justifications that have supported the practice over several centuries may
seem strange to the modern eye.10 Over the past several decades,
disenfranchisement has been met with resistance from many points on the
political spectrum.11 Some of this resistance has been in the form of federal
constitutional challenges to disenfranchisement laws, particularly under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.12 However,

1. Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: StateLevel Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016, SENTENCING PROJECT 3 (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimatesfelony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.cc/XA69-E868].
2. Id.
3. This note uses the term “criminal disenfranchisement” rather than “felon
disenfranchisement” because some states also disenfranchise persons for misdemeanor
criminal convictions. See Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72
VAND. L. REV. 55, 59 n.12 (2019).
4. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GV4W-W6YJ].
5. Id.
6. Uggen et al., supra note 1.
7. See infra Section VI.A.
8. See infra notes 296–99.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See, e.g., Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Midterms 2018: Restoring Voting Rights to ExFelons Is a Rare Bipartisan Issue, NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 2018, 4:09 PM),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/current/midterms-2018-restoring-voting-rights-to-exfelons-is-a-rare-bipartisan-issue [https://perma.cc/YM7A-394R].
12. See infra Part V.
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federal litigation efforts are unlikely to succeed under Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and current Supreme Court precedent.13
Therefore, those wishing to challenge the practice of
disenfranchisement should concentrate their efforts at the state level.14 The
most desirable avenue for this type of change is state legislation or state
constitutional amendments, but there is additional fertile ground to explore
in state constitutional challenges and executive action by governors.15
Changes to disenfranchisement laws can be fraught with compromise, as it
can be difficult to get past the political optics of restoring voting rights to
those convicted of crimes that society considers serious or disgusting.16
However, automatic restoration of voting rights after release from prison,
regardless of the crime committed, ultimately preserves the integrity of our
democratic system and encourages those convicted of crimes to reintegrate
into society, which reduces the risk that a person will re-offend.17 Advocates
of re-enfranchisement should take a careful look at the state-centered
approaches available in challenging criminal disenfranchisement and should
craft solutions that can withstand later political and legal challenges.18
Part I of this note gives a brief overview of the history of criminal
disenfranchisement in the United States. Part II examines the most common
rationales that have historically supported the practice. Part III explores
whether and how various states disenfranchise convicted persons. Part IV
evaluates how the justifications for criminal disenfranchisement hold up
today, including problems with the rationales underlying criminal
disenfranchisement and the unique barriers to reintegration that
disenfranchisement creates for those recently released from prison. Part V
considers past federal challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws and
discusses why these challenges have not succeeded in the past and are
unlikely to do so in the future. And finally, Part VI reviews the most
promising paths towards ending criminal disenfranchisement at the state
level and discusses the importance of crafting a long-lasting solution.

13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. See Paul Wright, Editorial: The Case Against Florida’s Amendment 4 on Felon
Voting Rights, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2018/oct/8/editorial-case-against-floridas-amendment-4-felon-voting-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/GD2S-DDWG].
17. See infra Section IV.C. This note does not consider the merits of allowing in-prison
voting, but advocates of re-enfranchisement may also want to consider if such an approach
could be politically possible and desirable in their states. See infra notes 107–16 and
accompanying text.
18. See infra Part VI.

126

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:123

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
The founding generation of the United States imported the concept
of criminal disenfranchisement from its English heritage.19 In England,
convicted criminals lost their civil rights through bills of attainder and were
thereafter powerless to transfer property.20 The rationale for this punishment
was “that the criminal’s act was evidence that he and his entire family were
corrupt and therefore unworthy of being feudal tenants” under the “doctrine
of corruption of blood.”21 Though the newly formed colonies abandoned the
doctrine of corruption, the founding generation retained the practice of
disenfranchisement:
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the removal of
voting rights had a visible and known dimension in
America. For example, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
loss of voting rights was permitted as an additional penalty
for “any shamefull and vitious crime,” such as sexual
relations. In Maryland, the law declared that a third
conviction for intoxication incurred loss of suffrage. The
reasoning behind a disenfranchisement statute in Plymouth
Colony in 1658 was stated in the law as: “some corrupt
members may creep into the best and purest societies.” In
addition, early colonial law dealt directly with the time
period for the loss of the right to vote. For instance, in
Plymouth the penalty seems to have been permanent, but
Connecticut law stated that “good behaviour shall cause
restoration of the privilege.” Furthermore, in both
Massachusetts and Connecticut, the decision to restore
voting rights was left to the court.22
After the Revolutionary War, the Framers gave the states the power
to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives” via Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution.23
Article II, Section 1 contains the parallel requirement for election of the
president: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”24 These clauses delegate the
19. See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The
Purity of the Ballot Box”, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301–02 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1302 (quoting Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941 (1970)).
22. Robin L. Nunn, Comment, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 763, 765–66 (2005).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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power to the states to fix the process by which federal elections are to take
place.25 When drafting the Constitution, the Framers considered prescribing
uniform qualifications for voting in federal elections.26 Instead, they decided
to defer to state franchise laws, mandating only that the same qualifications
for voting in state elections also qualify a person to vote for members of the
House of Representatives (the same requirement language was later applied
to electing members of the Senate by popular process via the Seventeenth
Amendment).27 This requirement was “a compromise, an outgrowth both of
an ideologically divided constitutional convention and the practical politics
of constitutional ratification.”28 Ironically, the Framers were concerned that
any federal qualifications specified in the Constitution would restrict the
franchise for those who had previously been able to vote under state law,
which could have been fatal to the Constitution’s ratification.29 Specifically,
the delegates who advocated uniform federal qualifications wanted to impose
a property ownership requirement.30 By allowing state qualifications for
suffrage to supplant a uniform federal rule, the Framers thought they had
solved “a potentially explosive political problem.”31 While this compromise
at first appeared to allow states to be more liberal in their franchise laws, the
other side of the coin was that they could also make the franchise more
restrictive:
The Constitution adopted in 1787 left the federal
government without any clear power or mechanism, other
than through constitutional amendment, to institute a
national conception of voting rights . . . . Although the
Constitution was promulgated in the name of “We, the
people of the United States,” the individual states retained
the power to define just who “the people” were. . . .
[C]itizenship in the new nation—controlled by the federal
government—was divorced from the right to vote, a fact that
was to have significant repercussions for almost two
centuries.32
Armed with this power to determine who “the people” were, more
than a third of the states retained colonial-era restrictions on the right to
25. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995).
26. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 21 (2000).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
28. KEYSSAR, supra note 26.
29. Id. at 23–24 (“As Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut observed during the 1787
Constitutional Convention, ‘the right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by
most of the state constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the national
Constitution, if it should subject them to be disenfranchised.’”).
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id.
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vote.33 These restrictions generally limited suffrage to white, propertyowning males.34 Other states broadened the franchise, but the increase in
persons who were able to vote was somewhat offset by socioeconomic
changes that reduced the number of property-owning men in more restrictive
states.35 By 1790, roughly sixty to seventy percent of white, adult men could
vote, but virtually no one else could.36
Several states also used the unique allocation of federal and state
power regarding voting rights to pass criminal disenfranchisement laws.37
Virginia was the first state to pass a statute that barred ex-felons from voting,
but more states soon followed.38 “[B]y the eve of the Civil War some two
dozen states had statutes barring felons from voting or had felon
disenfranchisement provisions in their state constitutions.”39 Since there were
only thirty-four states that had been admitted to the Union at that time, this
meant that over seventy percent of the states had enacted criminal
disenfranchisement laws prior to the Civil War.40 After the war, the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment limited the reasons for which a state could
disenfranchise its citizens, while appearing to affirm the practice of criminal
disenfranchisement.41 Section 2 of the amendment provides that “when the
right to vote . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of [a] State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” the state’s
representation in Congress shall be proportionally diluted.42
During the post-Civil War era, disenfranchisement laws became
even more visible.43 First, states along the Confederate-Union border enacted
laws that disenfranchised ex-Confederate soldiers unless they met certain
conditions.44 For example, some states required voters to “swear they would
support the federal Constitution and [that they] had been active supporters of
the Union and opponents of the Confederacy during the war” in order to be
eligible to vote.45 This type of oath was known as an “ironclad oath” because
it demanded both a future pledge of loyalty and a certification that the voter
33. Id.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id.
37. William Walton Liles, Comment, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws:
Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 617 (2007).
38. Id.
39. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 781
(Dec. 2002).
40. Liles, supra note 37, at 617.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
43. JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 36 (2006).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 37.
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had been loyal in the past.46 The Tennessee legislature went a step further
than the ironclad oath by passing a law that barred Confederate conscripts
from voting unless they could find two qualified voters to vouch for their
loyalty to the United States.47 Other Confederates were barred from voting
for either five or fifteen years, depending on the rank they held in the
Confederate Army during the war.48
In practice, however, “election officials in all Southern states had
great leeway in determining whether voters met statutory suffrage
requirements,” and Tennessee law encouraged election officials to allow
persons to vote who were “well known to the judges of the election to have
been unconditional Union men.”49 Across the former border states, these oath
laws “provided a good measure of the nation’s postwar mood. They
flourished while the passions roused by the war were still fresh; they died
quickly and signaled the coming end of Reconstruction as the passions of war
started to recede.”50 The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870
marked the decline of loyalty oaths and suffrage restrictions for exConfederate soldiers.51 Many Unionists believed the amendment would
effectively guard the suffrage rights of African-American persons in the
South and guarantee that ex-Confederates could not regain political control.52
Unionists and conservatives even found common ground in their quest for
suffrage for both former slaves and ex-Confederates.53 By 1872, exConfederates had been fully re-assimilated into the electorate.54
However, just as the passage of the Civil War amendments
convinced Unionists to relax the restrictions on ex-Confederate voting, others
in the former slave-holding states began to consider increasing the reach of
criminal disenfranchisement laws as an avenue to restrict African-American
voter turnout.55 In 1869, twenty-nine of the thirty-seven states then in
existence had passed criminal disenfranchisement laws.56 Between 1890 and
1910, some Southern states “tailored their criminal disenfranchisement laws,
along with other preexisting voting qualifications, to increase the effect of
these laws on black citizens.”57 Many of these states accomplished this goal

46. Id. at 36.
47. Id. at 37.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 37–38.
50. Id. at 41.
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Susan E. Marquardt, Comment, Deprivation of a Felon’s Right to Vote:
Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reform for Felony Disenfranchisement
Law, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 279, 281 (2005); Nunn, supra note 22, at 767.
56. Liles, supra note 37, at 617.
57. Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting
Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 540 (1993).
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by attaching disenfranchisement to crimes thought to be committed primarily
by African-American persons, but not to “white” crimes:
For instance, in Alabama, under state disenfranchisement
laws, a man convicted of vagrancy would lose his right to
vote, but a man convicted of killing his wife would not. In
the state of South Carolina, lawmakers made thievery,
adultery, arson, wife beating, housebreaking, and attempted
rape into felonies accompanied by the deprivation of voting
rights, while murder and fighting were excluded from
disenfranchisement.58
Some Southern lawmakers were explicit about their racist intentions
as well.59 In his opening address at Alabama’s 1901 constitutional
convention, John B. Knox, the convention’s president, asserted, “And what
is it that we want to do? Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal
Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this State.”60 The convention
that year amended the Alabama Constitution to add “any . . . crime involving
moral turpitude” to the list of enumerated crimes that resulted in
disenfranchisement upon conviction.61
Criminal disenfranchisement laws also swept across the Northern
states during this time period.62 By 1912, forty-two of the forty-eight states
then in existence had enacted criminal disenfranchisement provisions, either
by statute or as part of their state constitutions.63 All states, except for
Vermont and Maine, eventually adopted a criminal disenfranchisement
law.64
By 1974, challenges to these laws had begun to wind their ways
through the federal courts.65 On June 24, 1974, the Supreme Court held that
California’s criminal disenfranchisement law did not violate the U.S.
Constitution in Richardson v. Ramirez.66 Later that same year, California
passed Proposition 10:

58. Nunn, supra note 22, at 767–68.
59. Jamelle Bouie, The Ex-Con Factor, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 20, 2013), https://
prospect.org/article/ex-con-factor [https://perma.cc/34PV-JEFS].
60. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA, MAY 21ST, 1901 TO SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1901, 8 (1901).
61. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985).
62. Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation and the
‘Menace of Negro Domination’: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 565 (2003).
63. Id. at 565–66.
64. Id. at 565. Note that Maine and Vermont never disenfranchise persons with criminal
convictions, even while in prison. See infra notes 108–16 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
66. Id. at 56.
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which effectively restored voting rights to former felons.
California thus joined a growing number of states that
removed permanent voting restrictions for people convicted
of felonies, ‘infamous’ crimes and a variety of lesser
offenses. While this measure received little fanfare in the
media, its impact was substantial due to California’s
dramatic increase in incarceration rates beginning in the
1970s. Over the next 30 years, this change restored voting
rights for hundreds of thousands of citizens who otherwise
would have been disenfranchised.67
In 2001, other states began to roll back their criminal
disenfranchisement laws via legislative and executive action as well.68 This
trend toward allowing persons to vote upon completion of their sentences
continued for the next ten years.69 In 2002, the U.S. Senate considered an
amendment to an earlier statute that would have restored the right to vote to
ex-felons participating in federal elections.70 The measure failed by a vote of
31–63.71 Nevertheless, states continued to relax their criminal
disenfranchisement laws on their own,72 which allowed persons to regain the
right to vote in both state and federal elections.73 From 2001 to 2010, seven
states restored voting rights to some persons with criminal convictions by
either legislative or executive action.74
But in 2011, the landscape became more varied.75 Some states
continued to follow the trend of liberalizing disenfranchisement laws, while
others passed more restrictive measures or rescinded actions that had allowed
ex-felons to vote.76 Today, while at first glance it seems that criminal
disenfranchisement laws are more lenient than they have ever been before, a
record number of potential voters are kept away from the polls by these laws,

67. Michael C. Campbell, Criminal Disenfranchisement Reform in California: A
Deviant Case Study, 9(2) PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 177, 177–78 (Apr. 2007).
68. Historical Timeline—U.S. History of Felon Voting/Disenfranchisement,
PROCON.ORG [hereinafter Historical Timeline], https://felonvoting.procon.org/view.timeline.
php?timelineID=000016 (last updated June 25, 2013, 1:42:43 PM) [https://perma.cc/K3PGUY95].
69. Id.
70. 148 CONG. REC. S798 (Feb. 14, 2002) (“The right of an individual who is a citizen
of the United States to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be denied or abridged
because that individual has been convicted of a criminal offense unless, at the time of the
election, such individual— (1) is serving a felony sentence in a correctional institution or
facility; or (2) is on parole or probation for a felony offense.”).
71. Id. at S809.
72. Historical Timeline, supra note 68.
73. See supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text.
74. Historical Timeline, supra note 68.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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likely owing to the increase in the number of people charged with and
convicted of crimes in the U.S. in recent years.77
II. COMMON JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
LAWS
Broadly speaking, three policy justifications support criminal
disenfranchisement: the punishment rationale, the social-contract rationale,
and the election-integrity rationale. This part will address each in turn.
The punishment rationale is perhaps the most obvious justification
for disenfranchisement laws:
Criminal punishment can be meted out in various ways,
including imprisonment, fines, probation and the withdrawal
of certain rights and privileges. . . . In other areas of the law,
full rights and privileges are not always restored to convicts,
even though they may have “paid [their] debt to society.”
For example, federal law prohibits the possession of a
firearm for anyone indicted for or convicted of a felony
punishable by at least one year in prison.78
For those supporting this theory, temporary or permanent disenfranchisement
is part of measuring out justice to those who have violated the rules of social
order.79
Tied in the with the punishment justification is the notion that those
who have broken criminal laws have violated the Lockean social contract and
should not continue to benefit from that contract.80
According to traditional social contract rationale,
freely choosing individuals begin from an original
bargaining position and design a system of neutral
arrangements that will protect and promote their basic rights
and interests. Central to this reasoning is the idea that all
people have basic needs and that they form a community and
institute rules of governance in order to provide security and
77. See Overcriminalization, HERITAGE FOUND.: SOLUTIONS 2018, https://
solutions.heritage.org/protecting-the-rule-of-law/over-criminalization (last visited Aug. 14,
2019) [https://perma.cc/3NF9-C6HZ]; Overcriminalization, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, https://www.nacdl.org/overcrim (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
XS5X-SD9L].
78. Roger Clegg, George T. Conway III & Kenneth K. Lee, The Case Against Felon
Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2008).
79. Brian Pinaire, Milton Heumann & Laura Bilotta, Barred from the Vote: Public
Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1521
(2003).
80. Clegg et al., supra note 78, at 17.
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a structure that will allow them to enjoy their liberty. A
violation of the terms of the “contract” disrupts the balance
of rights and responsibilities, invites a punitive response
according to pre-determined rules, and essentially (at least
temporarily) strips the individual of her right to participate
in the political process.81
Then-governor of Massachusetts, Paul Celluci, articulated a similar
rationale in 2000 in support of a ballot initiative that took the right to vote
away from incarcerated felons, saying, “It makes no sense. We incarcerate
people and we take away their right to run their own lives and leave them
with the ability to influence how we run our lives?”82 Similarly, writing for
the majority in Green v. Board of Elections, Judge Henry Friendly of the
Second Circuit opined that a “man who breaks the laws he has authorized his
agent to make for his own governance could fairly have been thought to have
abandoned the right to participate in further administering the compact.”83
A third common rationale behind criminal disenfranchisement is the
concern that ex-offenders will threaten the integrity of elections by forming
a voting bloc in favor of officials who would be more lenient in prosecuting
crimes or in defining crimes at the legislative level.84 In Green, Judge
Friendly also touched on this rationale:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to
decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part
in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives
who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for
further violations, or the judges who are to consider their
cases. This is especially so when account is taken of the
heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of
organized crime.85
Supporters of this rationale might also be concerned that those who have been
punished by the criminal justice system will resent it more and that this
resentment might skew the results of elections, which are supposed to help
determine the public’s attitude toward the current system of crime and
punishment.86
81. Pinaire et al., supra note 79, at 1525–26.
82. Clegg et al., supra note 78, at 17.
83. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
84. Clegg et al., supra note 78, at 18 (“[T]he abolition of felon disenfranchisement laws
may have the unintended effect of creating ‘anti-law enforcement’ voting blocs . . . .”).
85. Green, 380 F.2d at 451. Ironically, current evidence, discussed infra, suggests that
allowing persons convicted of crimes to regain the right to vote is actually one step towards
decreasing recidivism.
86. George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1906 (1999).
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Perhaps all three rationales can be distilled into a more general
distrust of persons who have been convicted of crimes.87 Supporters of
disenfranchisement laws may feel that society considers convicted persons,
“even those who have completed their prison terms, to be less trustworthy
and responsible than non-convicted citizens.”88 In particular, the socialcontract theory and the less-trustworthy theory have been cited as the
prevailing schools of thought undergirding criminal disenfranchisement laws
over the last several decades.89
As mentioned in Part I, in 2002 the United States Senate debated an
amendment to the Equal Protection of Voting Rights Act of 2001 that would
have restored the right to vote in federal elections to persons convicted of
crimes upon completion of their sentences, including any probation or
parole.90 During the floor debate, Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky
articulated several of the prevalent rationales underlying criminal
disenfranchisement laws in a few passionate paragraphs:
Voting is a privilege; a privilege properly exercised at the
voting booth, not from a prison cell. States have a significant
interest in reserving the vote for those who have abided by
the social contract that forms the foundation of a
representative democracy. We are talking about rapists,
murderers, robbers, and even terrorists or spies. Do we want
to see convicted terrorists who seek to destroy this country
voting in elections? Do we want to see convicted spies who
cause great damage to this country voting in elections? Do
we want to see “jailhouse blocs” banding together to oust
sheriffs and government officials who are tough on crime?91
During the same debate, then-Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama
echoed similar concerns, though perhaps in a more reserved way:
As a prosecutor for 15 years, I wonder about how those
people I helped put in the slammer feel about me. I do not
care about them voting on my election. Would it intimidate
or discourage or diminish the ability of judges who run for
election? Or would a prosecutor who runs for election in
some way not be as aggressive? Would it be a concern to
them? Would it allow votes to occur against a strong law87. Clegg et al., supra note 78, at 18.
88. Id.
89. See Hadar Aviram, Allyson Bragg & Chelsea Lewis, Felon Disenfranchisement, 13
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 295, 298–99 (2017); Clegg et al., supra note 78, at 17–19; Note,
supra note 19, at 1304–09.
90. 148 CONG. REC. S798 (Feb. 14, 2002).
91. Id. at S802.

2019]

CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT

135

and-order candidate that might not otherwise occur? I do not
know. . . . Frankly, I do not think the American debate and
American policy is going to be better informed if we have a
bunch of felons in this process as opposed to them not being
in this process. That is my 2 cents’ worth.92
Senator George Allen from Virginia also mentioned several of the
rationales supporting disenfranchisement in his remarks during the floor
debate. But before he did this, he pointed out that many states already had a
system in place to restore voting rights and that, in theory, any person could
regain his or her voting rights though petition to the governor.93 According
to Senator Allen, this process, time-consuming and cumbersome as it may
be, is part of the punishment for having committed a crime:
Sometimes it can be cumbersome, and it is time consuming
for the Governor as well as those in the Secretary of the
Commonwealth’s office, the attorney general’s office, the
Governor’s staff and others to assemble this information,
and also for the petitioner, as well.
That is part of the price one pays when they commit a felony
and they are convicted beyond a reasonable doubt by a judge
and a jury of that crime. This is one of the many rights one
gives up. . . . Many of the felony cases were vile,
premeditated, deliberate acts to commit a felony—not a
misdemeanor, a felony—and this is one of the prices and
penalties that one pays.94
Senator Allen also articulated federalism concerns with the idea of
restoring federal voting rights, which could undercut the goals a state may be
trying to achieve through its system of disenfranchisement:
A person loses their liberty, obviously, while incarcerated.
To get all of their liberties and rights back, they have to
demonstrate good behavior. In each State, that
demonstration may be slightly different. But these are State
laws being violated. It is a proper role of the people in the
States to determine when these rights should be restored, as
well as, under what conditions and circumstances the rights
are restored.95

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at S804.
Id. at S807.
Id.
Id.
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The United States Supreme Court has also had occasion to weigh in
on the policy rationales behind criminal disenfranchisement but has not done
so with the clarity that many would prefer. The lead Supreme Court case on
state felon disenfranchisement laws, Richardson v. Ramirez,96 declined to
articulate a modern policy rationale for continuing this practice. The Court
instead wrote:
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curia, are
contentions that these notions are outmoded, and that the
more modern view is that it is essential to the process of
rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in
society as a fully participating citizen when he has
completed the serving of his term. We would by no means
discount these arguments if addressed to the legislative
forum which may properly weigh and balance them against
those advanced in support of California’s present
constitutional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one
set of values over the other. If respondents are correct, and
the view which they advocate is indeed the more enlightened
and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of
California will ultimately come around to that view. And if
they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of
the fact that there are two sides to the argument.97
The Court, however, did not indicate what the other side of the
argument might be. Eleven years later, in Hunter v. Underwood, the Court
considered a challenge to the “catchall” provision in Alabama’s state
constitution that disenfranchised anyone convicted of a crime of “moral
turpitude.”98 However, the Court refrained from discussing the basis for
disenfranchisement laws in general, holding only that the moral turpitude
provision at issue was unconstitutional because its “original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and
the section [continued] to have that effect” and thus violated equal protection
principles.99 The Court also declined to revisit its Richardson holding,
signaling that it still accepted the practice of criminal disenfranchisement as
constitutional in the abstract.100
At least in theory, the asserted rationales for disenfranchisement
have stayed consistent over the years.101 However, a survey conducted in
96. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
97. Id. at 55.
98. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
99. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Roger Clegg & Hans A. von Spakovsky, There Are Good Reasons for
Felons to Lose the Right to Vote, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/
election-integrity/commentary/there-are-good-reasons-felons-lose-the-right-vote
[https://
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2003 found that the leading reason members of the public supported criminal
disenfranchisement laws was that “felons have proven that they should not
be treated as citizens” (selected by 32.7% of the survey respondents), but
this option was closely followed by the “none of the above/some other
category” selection (31.1%).102 This data suggests that that lay persons in
favor of criminal disenfranchisement laws, like the U.S. Supreme Court, have
a hard time articulating exactly why.103
III. STATE APPROACHES TO VOTING RIGHTS FOR PERSONS
CONVICTED OF CRIMES
A state’s criminal disenfranchisement laws affect its citizens for
purposes of voting in both state and federal elections.104 There is currently no
federal statute on voting with respect to the rights of persons convicted of
crimes.105 The Supreme Court has indicated at least twice that criminal
disenfranchisement laws are constitutional.106 Because the states have wide
latitude in this area, various approaches to criminal disenfranchisement have
developed across the country.
First, in Maine and Vermont, persons convicted of crimes never lose
their right to vote, even while incarcerated.107 For example, in Vermont,
prison staff inform inmates about their rights to vote in an upcoming election
ninety days before that election takes place.108 Prison staff then post voter
guidelines in the prison library that include information on how the process
operates.109 Inmates who wish to vote register, request an absentee ballot, and
mail it in.110 Prisoners must register wherever they most recently lived, and
those with out-of-state residency are unable to participate in the prisonervoting process.111 Those with residency in Vermont who are housed in an
out-of-state prison are still able to vote using this procedure.112 In 2016,
perma.cc/Z4GN-ZGBN] (articulating many of the same rationales for criminal
disenfranchisement as have been discussed in this note, including the social contract theory).
102. Pinaire et al., supra note 79, at 1541.
103. Id. The authors of the study also opine that they may have missed a popular option.
The other options were “Felons are not punished enough by the criminal justice system”;
“There are some rights that should be revoked permanently;” “Those who commit felony
offenses are not good citizens”; and “All of the above.” Id. at 1535.
104. See supra notes 23–36.
105. See supra notes 23–36.
106. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24 (1974).
107. Felon Voting Rights, supra note 4.
108. Jane C. Timm, Most States Disenfranchise Felons. Maine and Vermont Allow
Inmates to Vote from Prison, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 3:43 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-rethink-prisoner-voting-rightsincarceration-rates-rise-n850406 [https://perma.cc/G4FR-NCUZ].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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California began to implement a similar process for those convicted of
felonies who are serving their time in county jails, but not those incarcerated
in state or federal prison.113
Because the process is completed by absentee ballot, it is hard to
track how many prisoners in Vermont and Maine actually take advantage of
the right to vote while incarcerated.114 However, advocates for prisoner
voting cite the powerful restorative effects it can have, including combatting
the isolation and loneliness often experienced by those in prison and
preparing prisoners to reengage in civic life after their release.115 Notably,
prisoner voting in Maine and Vermont has enjoyed bipartisan support, with
a spokesman for the Vermont Republican Party telling NBC News in
February 2018, “The last thing we want to do is start putting up
insurmountable barriers to participation in civic life because someone may
have been convicted of a crime. People’s right to vote is sacred.”116
Second, some states have relatively permissive processes for
allowing persons convicted of crimes to regain the right to vote upon release
from prison. In fourteen states and the District of Columbia, persons released
from prison have their voting rights automatically restored.117 These states
include Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Montana, and Maryland.118 However, it is
worth noting that in Maryland, a conviction for voting fraud by buying or
selling votes can only be restored through a pardon from the governor.119
Third, in twenty-two other states, persons are eligible for automatic
restoration of voting rights upon completion of their sentence, including any
parole or probation.120 However, some of these states have the added hurdle
of requiring a person to pay any outstanding fines, fees, or restitution before
their rights are restored.121 While these restrictions may seem like a
reasonable extension of the requirement that a person complete their entire
sentence before regaining the right to vote, opponents of these restrictions
have criticized them as setting up a “fines and fees” regime that
disproportionately affects persons of color and persons of limited means.122
Opponents of these more restrictive laws charge that they create “an
113. Felon Voting Rights, supra note 4; Patrick McGreevy, Felons in County Jails to Be
Allowed to Vote in California Elections, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016, 1:42 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-sac-essential-politics-updates-felons-injails-to-be-allowed-to-vote-1475094969-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/KU5C-YCGC].
114. Timm, supra note 108.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Felon Voting Rights, supra note 4.
118. Id.
119. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
of Gen. Assemb.).
120. Felon Voting Rights, supra note 4.
121. Id.
122. Edward Burmila, How to Fight Voter Suppression in 2018, DISSENT MAG. (July 11,
2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/how-to-fight-voter-suppressiontactics-2018-practical-guide [https://perma.cc/R9X6-2A8V].
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underclass of thousands of people who are unable to vote because they do
not have enough money.”123 Opponents point out that those convicted of
crimes often have a hard time finding work and thus paying off any fees or
restitution they owe.124 In addition, interest on these debts may accumulate
the longer a person goes without paying them off.125 If a person has more
than one conviction on his or her record, these fees, fines, restitution, and
interest can stack up.126 For example, a recent study of criminal convictions
in Washington State found that the median lifetime assessment of fines, fees,
and restitution for persons convicted of multiple crimes was $7,234.127 Fines
are usually assessed without considering a person’s income level, so these
obligations likely create a particularly acute problem in low-income
communities.128 While states that provide for automatic voting rights
restoration upon completion of all sentencing and financial obligations may
seem to have fairly permissive processes for restoration of voting rights, in
many cases the financial obligations become tantamount to a lifetime ban
from the ballot box.129
Fourth, in twelve states, a person with a criminal conviction may be
required to wait a period of time after completion of his or her sentence
(including any probation or parole) before regaining the right to vote, to seek
a pardon from the governor of his or her state, or may even lose his or her
voting rights indefinitely upon conviction of certain categories of crime.130
For example, persons convicted of any felony in Kentucky must individually
apply with the Governor to have their voting rights restored.131 In 2015,
former Kentucky governor Steve Beshear restored voting rights to persons
with non-violent felony convictions via executive order.132 However, in the
same year, newly-elected governor Matt Bevin reversed this executive order,
writing:
It is inappropriate to view this issue in partisan terms,
especially since the restoration of civil rights is
fundamentally a question of democracy and fairness,
123. Connor Sheets, Too Poor to Vote: How Alabama’s “New Poll Tax” Bars Thousands
of People from Voting, AL.COM, https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/10/too_poor_
to_vote_how_alabamas.html (last updated July 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/R9X6-2A8V].
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case of
Legal Financial Obligations, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 313 (2017).
127. Id. at 313–14.
128. Id.
129. See Sheets, supra note 123 (profiling Alabama woman who was convicted of credit
card fraud in 2011, owes the state more than $11,500 in restitution, fines, fees, and interest,
and believes she will never be able to pay this debt off in full because she is disabled and
recovering from drug addiction, and her only income is $722 from Social Security).
130. Felon Voting Rights, supra note 4.
131. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045(1)(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2018).
132. KY. EXEC. ORDER 2015-871 (2015).
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constitutes a public policy issue, and is an issue that should
be determined based on what we, the people of this state,
think is appropriate and fair, and not on the opinions of
certain individuals.133
Now, the Kentucky Department of Corrections is required to
promulgate regulations for restoration of civil rights to persons with felony
convictions.134 These regulations currently prevent an estimated 9.1% of
persons in Kentucky from voting—a dramatic increase from 2.2% in 1980.135
Similarly, under Mississippi’s constitution, persons convicted of “murder,
rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense,
perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy” may never vote again unless they
can convince the governor to grant them a pardon or convince two-thirds of
both houses of the state legislature to restore their voting rights.136 Between
the years 2000 and 2015 only an estimated 335 persons had their voting rights
restored in Mississippi.137
Finally, many states have carve-outs for categories of persons who
may never regain the right to vote. For example, the Alabama Constitution
states, “No person convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, or who is
mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil and
political rights or removal of disability.”138 While Alabama law defines
which crimes qualify as “of moral turpitude,” certain crimes are excepted
from the process to apply for restoration of voting rights.139 These crimes
include murder, rape, incest, certain sexual offenses, and treason.140 Persons
convicted of these crimes must receive a pardon for them before they are
eligible to apply for restoration of voting rights.141 In Delaware, persons
convicted of murder, bribery, and certain sexual offenses are also
permanently disenfranchised.142
Similarly, the Iowa constitution bars anyone convicted of an
“infamous crime” from voting.143 In 2016, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that
all felonies are “infamous crimes” within the meaning of the constitutional
provision and thus a conviction for any felony could result in permanent

133. KY. EXEC. ORDER 2015-052 (2015).
134. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2018).
135. Ben Carter, Voting Rights for Kentucky Felons May Get New Life After Florida
Case, COURIER J. (May 9, 2018, 12:53 PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/
columnists/2018/05/09/kentucky-felons-voting-rights-back-after-florida-case/594252002/
[https://perma.cc/4V7S-AFS7].
136. MISS. CONST. art. 12, §§ 241, 253; MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-41 (2002).
137. Uggen et al., supra note 1.
138. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177.
139. ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(g) (2018).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. DEL. CONST. art. 5, § 2.
143. IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5.
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disenfranchisement.144 The only way for a person with a felony conviction in
Iowa to regain the right to vote is to receive executive clemency from the
governor.145 In 2005, then-governor Tom Vilsack used an executive order to
restore voting rights to persons with felony convictions.146 His successor,
Terry Branstad, rescinded this executive order in 2011, citing his belief that
filling out the application for restoration of voting rights and paying any
restitution, court costs, and other fees are important steps in the process of a
person’s reintegration into society.147
IV. DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS A CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCE
Criminal disenfranchisement is an inappropriate form of criminal
punishment in today’s world. The justifications for the practice have been
weak since their inception and have only deteriorated over time.148 In
addition, any benefit derived from continuing to disenfranchise those who
have committed crimes is far outweighed by the harms disenfranchisement
works.149 As this section will discuss, disenfranchisement sets up collateral
consequences for those released from prison that inhibit their successful
reintegration.150 It also poses further barriers to rehabilitation and can
contribute to recidivism.151
A. Rationale Problems
The most common theories advanced in favor of criminal
disenfranchisement laws have little application in today’s world. First, the
less-trustworthy rationale for disenfranchisement laws was at its strongest
just after the Civil War, when Unionists were worried that ex-Confederates
might band together to defeat the goals of the Reconstruction Era.152 This
fear was at least partly justified by the fact that the ex-Confederate soldiers
had just participated in an armed uprising against the United States.153
However, today there is no evidence that persons who have been convicted
of crimes would be motivated to form the kind of voting bloc that Senators
McConnell and Sessions worried about in 2002.154
144. Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 205 (Iowa 2016) (“In the end, we are constrained
to conclude that all objective indicia of today’s standard of infamy supports the conclusion
that an infamous crime has evolved to be defined as a felony.”).
145. Executive Clemency, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA, https://bop.iowa.gov/
executive-clemency (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/V8NF-GR95].
146. IOWA EXEC. ORDER 42 (2005).
147. IOWA EXEC. ORDER 70 (2011).
148. See infra Section IV.A.
149. See infra Sections IV.B–C.
150. See infra Section IV.B.
151. See infra Section IV.C.
152. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
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In fact, the studies and data are mixed on how much even total reenfranchisement of persons convicted of crimes would affect the outcome of
elections.155 Even if persons do immediately begin exercising their restored
rights, there is little evidence of how this would affect the electorate in terms
of political persuasion.156 Some studies suggest that re-enfranchisement
could swing particularly tight races,157 while others suggest that the turnout
among persons with criminal convictions would be relatively low and the
political make-up of the group would be similar to the rest of the electorate.158
There is even less evidence that persons would use their newly
restored rights to form an anarchist voting bloc or that such efforts would be
successful.159 In any event, disenfranchising persons because they might form
a renegade coalition that could impact the results of an election would be
preemptive punishment, which is inconsistent with the nullum crimen sine
lege principle that underlies our justice system.160 In addition, there is no
constitutional justification for punishing someone for voting “the wrong
way.”161 In a 1965 case regarding the right of soldiers stationed in Texas to
vote in Texas elections, the Supreme Court wrote, “‘Fencing out’ from the
franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is
constitutionally impermissible.”162 Nor is there a justification for excluding
a person from voting due to his or her personal biases.163 The less-trustworthy
rationale also assumes that a person’s status as a convicted person is what
155. Elena Holodny, Millions of American Adults Are Not Allowed to Vote—And They
Could Change History, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/what-if-felons-could-vote-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/AF2F-M5DU]
(“It’s difficult to predict how felon and ex-felon disenfranchisement affects election results
for several reasons, including, for example, that it’s hard to estimate how many ex-felons
would turn out to vote if their voting rights were restored.”); Joshua Replogle & Adriana
Gomez Licon, Florida Felons Rejoice After Regaining Their Right to Vote, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(updated Jan. 8, 2019, 4:56 PM), https://www.apnews.com/a0086670a6df42c9a3d2857
d1606e027 [https://perma.cc/BH55-E3S2] (“There is very little evidence that individuals who
have the opportunity to have their rights restored [would] immediately take advantage of that
opportunity.”).
156. See Spencer Macnaughton, Will Florida Measure Restoring Vote to 1.4 Million ExPrisoners Swing State?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
video/will-florida-measure-restoring-vote-to-14-million-ex-prisoners-swing-state/35F5F552EACA-485D-9E37-CAA6CE34DB3D.html [https://perma.cc/QR2S-37AP]; Replogle &
Licon, supra note 155.
157. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting
Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 43 (2015).
158. Id.
159. Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the
Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 112 (2005).
160. This is also known as the legality principle and frequently translated as “no crime
without law.” See Stefan Glaser, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, 24 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 29,
30 (1942) (“The principle, nullum crimen sine lege, was invoked as a guarantee of civic liberty
against the omnipotence and despotism of the State and of the judge.”).
161. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 112.
162. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
163. Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1906.
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drives his or her voting choices, rather than the lived experience, habit, or
instinct to which we attribute the voting decisions of other persons.164
Second, the social-contract rationale is similarly unavailing. The
underlying theory of this rationale would seem to indicate that convicted
persons are not entitled to any of the rights and privileges that accompany
being part of society, but this is not the outcome of a criminal conviction
today.165 As the Supreme Court wrote in 1958, “[c]itizenship is not a license
that expires upon misbehavior.”166 Since the government still retains
obligations towards citizens, even after they have committed crimes, then a
criminal conviction does not “cancel” the social contract.167 “If [the social
contract theory] is not a legitimate justification for denying convicted felons
police protection or access to the courts, then it strains belief to assert it is a
valid reason for denying them the vote.”168
Finally, while disenfranchisement may seem justifiable as part of the
punishment for the crime committed, it is unclear what goal of punishment
disenfranchisement serves. Disenfranchisement may seem consistent with a
retributive theory of criminal punishment.169 Retribution prioritizes making
an offender experience pain in return for the pain they have caused.170 The
theory also teaches that there must be a connection between the punishment
and the wrongdoing.171 However, disenfranchisement has little or no
connection to the vast majority of crimes committed today:
[T]here is a vast range of offenses that constitute a felony,
and most bear little resemblance to the electoral process at
all. Also, there is little indication that those who have been
previously convicted of tampering with an election would
automatically try it again upon parole. And even if there was
such an indication, criminal sentences are designed to detain
someone until they are no longer the threat to society and
can reenter society and resume being innocent until proven
guilty. A drunk driver is not forever prohibited from driving
again, nor is a spousal abuser prevented from dating and
marriage.172

164. See id. (“[B]ias does not disqualify people from voting. Indeed voting is precisely
about expressing biases, loyalties, commitments, and personal values.”).
165. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 112.
166. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958).
167. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 112.
168. Id. at 112–13.
169. Eli L. Levine, Does the Social Contract Justify Felony Disenfranchisement?, 1
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 193, 218–20 (2009).
170. Id. at 218.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 217.
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With this essential link broken, disenfranchisement does not fulfill the
retributive function of punishment.173 Moreover, applying lengthy or lifetime
disenfranchisement to all persons with felony convictions, regardless of the
relationship of this punishment to the offense or its severity, is neither
rational nor proportional.174
The arguments for disenfranchisement as a deterrent or a form of
rehabilitation are even weaker.175 To begin, a person on the brink of
committing a crime is unlikely to pause to consider “the sacredness of
participating in the political process” and what it would mean to lose his right
to vote.176 In addition, persons tend to commit crimes when they are young
and tend to become more appreciative of the right to vote as they get older.177
Thus, it is illogical to punish someone for a right they will likely not
appreciate until they are older and less likely to be engaging in criminal
behavior.178 Finally, disenfranchisement is a particularly ineffective form of
rehabilitation.179 The goal of rehabilitation is “to restore and develop the
morality of a criminal so that he may rejoin society as a decent, lawabiding citizen.”180 It is hard to conceive of a rationale that would connect
disenfranchisement with any positive impact on a person’s reentry into
society.181
B. Collateral Effects to a Collateral Consequence
A less-discussed, but pressing, issue with criminal
disenfranchisement laws is the effect of the collateral consequences that
accompany not being a registered voter. Disenfranchisement itself is
considered a collateral consequence to a criminal conviction because it is not
part of a person’s sentence.182 It is also referred to as a “civil disability”
triggered by the state as a consequence of the conviction.183 However, this
civil disability carries with it its own set of further consequences.
For example, the federal court system selects potential jurors from
state lists of registered voters.184 These lists may be supplemented by lists of
driver’s license holders in the state, but those with felony convictions whose
civil rights have not been restored are barred from jury service regardless.185
173. Id. at 218.
174. Id. at 220.
175. Id. at 220–24.
176. Id. at 221.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 223.
180. Id. at 222.
181. Id. at 223.
182. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 370 (2012).
183. Id. at 371.
184. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863, 1866, 1869 (2014).
185. See § 1865(b)(5).
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The majority of states have similar provisions that bar persons with felony
convictions from serving on juries.186 This reality becomes more troubling
given the disparate racial impact of voter disenfranchisement.187 Twentythree states currently disenfranchise five percent or more of their AfricanAmerican adult population, compared to only nine states that did so in
1980.188 In Kentucky, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia, the rate is over
twenty percent.189 While these percentages seem like they would have a
relatively small impact on the racial make-up of juries, the effect of criminal
disenfranchisement intersects with other trends in the racial make-up of
juries.190 This impact is difficult to measure because of the variables created
by choice of venue, the make-up of jury pools, and preemptory challenges,
but “given the sheer magnitude of the estimated number of individuals with
felony convictions (especially among African-Americans), it is difficult to
imagine that felon jury exclusion has no impact on the persistent
underrepresentation of African-American jurors.”191 One 2011 study
conducted in Georgia found that approximately fourteen percent of AfricanAmerican persons in the state were excluded from juries due to their felon
status.192 While areas with both high and low African-American populations
had high levels of African-American exclusion, the study found higher levels
of exclusion tended to occur in rural areas.193 This is significant because of
the “ripple effect” that racial jury exclusion can create, where “inequalities
in the jury selection system ultimately lead to greater levels of racial
inequality throughout the criminal justice system itself.”194
In addition to jury service, presence on a state’s voter roll may be
necessary to participate in civic life even before election day. Twenty-four
states allow voters to bypass their state legislatures to enact proposed statutes
and, in some states, constitutional amendments, by placing initiatives on the
state election ballots.195 Most of these states require organizers of a ballot
initiative to obtain a certain number of signatures from registered voters who
support the initiative.196 These initiatives are powerful avenues for change
because they do not require legislative approval.197 However, criminal

186. Darren Wheelock, A Jury of One’s “Peers”: The Racial Impact of Felon Jury
Exclusion in Georgia, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 335, 336 (2011).
187. See Uggen et al., supra note 1, at figs. 6–7.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Wheelock, supra note 186, at 336.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 347.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 353–54.
195. Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept.
20, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-andrecall-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/CNZ7-28TC].
196. Id.
197. See infra Section VI.A.
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disenfranchisement keeps persons with criminal convictions from
participating in this avenue, possibly for the rest of their lives.
This situation can produce ironic results. For example, a petition for
a local ballot initiative that benefits persons with felony convictions—such
as changing the hiring procedure for public jobs so that an applicant has a
chance to interview before disclosing their felon status—could only be
signed by persons without felony convictions or those who have had their
voting rights restored. However, restoration may be a practical impossibility
in some states.198 This further disadvantages persons with criminal
convictions by making them subject to the political desires of others.199
Disenfranchisement has an extreme impact on the individual by “directly
limit[ing] participation in critical areas of life” and prolonging the
consequences of the conviction, potentially for the rest of a person’s life.200
Finally, criminal disenfranchisement has collateral consequences not
only for the individuals affected by it, but also for the communities that
surround them.201 During the 2010 census, the U.S. Census Bureau counted
incarcerated persons at the addresses of the prison facilities, rather than their
previous addresses in their home communities.202 This means that
[d]istricts with prisons are constructed on the backs of
“ghost voters,” packing in prisoners who count toward the
district size but who, with few exceptions, are not permitted
to vote, and who, with few exceptions, have no connection
whatsoever to the other residents of the district. This
artificially inflates the political power of residents in prison
districts, and artificially deflates the power of residents
everywhere else.203
This has a particularly harsh effect on the neighborhoods the incarcerated
persons originated from, which leads to “a systemic distortion of the
population picture,” which is in turn built into the distribution of
democracy.204 In some districts:
The skew can become quite extreme: in 2006, for example,
voters in three of the city council wards of Anamosa, Iowa,
were busily engaged in the democratic process. But 1300 of
the 1358 individuals allotted to ward 2 were incarcerated —
198. See supra Part III.
199. See infra Section IV.C.
200. Cammett, supra note 182, at 371–72.
201. Id. at 366.
202. Id.
203. U.S. Census and Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 27, 2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/us-census-and-incarceration [https://perma.cc/RX9E
-M4MP].
204. Id.
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and so the city councilman was elected with one write-in
vote from his wife and one from his neighbor.205
While most communities will not experience such extreme
consequences, this example illustrates how denial of voting rights can have
a “profound influence on entire communities through vote dilution and
further economic displacement from the redistribution of federal
resources.”206 Thus, criminal disenfranchisement imposes collateral
consequences on entire communities.207
C. Roadblocks to Rehabilitation
In addition to the collateral consequences that follow
disenfranchisement, the feelings of helplessness and disconnect from civic
life that may accompany life after prison can contribute to recidivism.208 As
the view that punishment should serve to rehabilitate a person continues to
enjoy widespread popularity,209 criminal disenfranchisement laws send the
message that complete rehabilitation in the wake of a criminal conviction is
not possible.210 Thus, scholars hypothesize that
such alienation and isolation can only serve to increase
further incidences of criminal activity. In other words, if one
has no stake in the community of which they are a part, then
there is little incentive to behave in a pro-social manner other
than avoidance of punishment in the form of
[reincarceration] – a deterrent which, for many individuals,
may be a threat that is more rote than daunting.211
While perhaps not the intention of all proponents of voter disenfranchisement
laws, these laws communicate to convicted persons that they are excluded
from the “basic building blocks of everyday life,” entrenching their status as
“outsiders.”212
In this way, disenfranchisement may appropriately be considered a
modern form of outlawry213—one of the harshest penalties in early Germanic
205. Id.
206. Cammett, supra note 182, at 366.
207. Id.
208. Danielle R. Jones, When the Fallout of a Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far:
Challenging Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 237, 251 (2015).
209. See supra Part II.
210. Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matthew Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The
Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407, 413
(2012).
211. Id. at 413–14.
212. Jones, supra note 208, at 251.
213. Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, supra note 210, at 414.
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law—which declared a person outside the protections and benefits of the law.
In fact, then-Senator Jeff Sessions categorized disenfranchisement this way
in his 2002 floor speech to the Senate as legislators considered a
Constitutional amendment allowing disenfranchised persons to regain the
right to vote in federal elections:
Historically, we have referred to [people with felony
convictions] as being outside the law or, in short, outlaws.
All the way through the beginning of the United States of
America, we have believed that a person who violates
serious laws of a State or the Federal Government forfeits
their right to participate in those activities of that
government, that their judgement and character is such that
they ought not to be making decisions on the most important
issues facing our country.214
While the empirical research of the effect of criminal
disenfranchisement laws on recidivism is limited,215 there is evidence that
voting behavior is inversely correlated with incarceration, rearrest, and selfreported criminality.216 When a person is barred from voting due to a criminal
conviction, not only is the retributive function of punishment extended
beyond its logical end, but the rehabilitative function is also undercut.217
Though it is in society’s best interest to foster the successful reentry of
persons coming out of incarceration and encourage their return to the civic
process, restricting the franchise is one roadblock (of many) that makes
performing the duties of citizenship difficult.218
V. FEDERAL CHALLENGES TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
“There are so many constitutional arguments against the
disenfranchisement of felons that one can only wonder at the survival of the
practice.”219 Yet survive it does. One important factor enabling the survival
of disenfranchisement is the uncertainty around whether voting is a right or
a privilege.220 The Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly guarantee the
214. 148 CONG. REC. S1495 (Feb. 14, 2002).
215. Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, supra note 210, at 414.
216. Id.
217. See supra Section IV.A.
218. Cammett, supra note 182, at 400. Other widely recognized roadblocks are
“significant limitations on employment, restrictions on occupational licenses, barriers to
public and private housing, thwarted access to legal immigration, ineligibility for public
benefits, limited access to educational loans, the inability to maintain parental rights or act as
a foster parent, qualifications for jury service, and child support enforcement for debt accrued
during a period of incarceration.” Id. at 371–72.
219. Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1903.
220. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 103.

2019]

CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT

149

ability of all persons to vote, but rather affords implicit protection by
penalizing states who deny or abridge the ability to vote.221 Although the
amendment describes the ability to vote as the “right to vote,”222 early
Supreme Court precedent indicates that voting was conceived of as a
privilege, even after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments.223 In
Murphy v. Ramsey, the Court upheld a law that barred persons practicing
polygamy from voting in Utah territory.224 The Court characterized a state’s
right to limit the franchise as broad, going so far as to say that states could
limit the franchise based on any status “made necessary by law,” including
marital status as an example.225 Just five years later, in Davis v. Beason, the
Court went even further by declaring that a state could limit the franchise by
using any “reasonable qualification.”226
Of course, this understanding of the ability to vote did not survive.227
Justices Marshall and Brennan cast doubt on the viability of Murphy and
Beason in later years, writing that the decisions were “surely of minimal
continuing precedential value.”228 In addition, “[c]onstitutional amendments,
statutes, and court decisions all have transformed the character of suffrage:
once considered a privilege, it is now a right of adult citizenship.”229 Since
Murphy and Beason were decided, the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments were passed—giving women the right to vote and reducing the
voting age to 18.230 The Supreme Court also struck down poll taxes and
compelled states to loosen their residency requirements.231 The Court has
also emphasized suffrage as a right that safeguards the other rights of
citizenship, writing in Reynolds v. Sims:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for

221. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see Uggen & Manza, supra note 39, at 779 and
accompanying text.
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
223. See Uggen & Manza, supra note 39, at 779–80.
224. 114 U.S. 15, 44–45 (1885).
225. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 103.
226. 133 U.S. 333, 346 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
227. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 103.
228. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 103 (emphasis added).
230. U.S. CONST. amends. XIX, XXVI.
231. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358, 360 (1972) (residency requirements);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–67 (1966) (poll taxes).
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classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges
this right.232
However, the Court flatly declared a few decades later in Bush v.
Gore that “[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote
for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power
to appoint members of the electoral college.”233 Thus, the “right” to vote lies
in a “constitutional no man’s land.”234 This uncertainty has led to a system in
which many different exercises of state discretion are permissible: from
allowing persons to continue voting while incarcerating to disenfranchising
certain persons for the rest of their lives.235
In the federal courts, numerous constitutional challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement laws have been attempted.236 Hunter v. Underwood,
which held that Alabama’s “moral turpitude” catchall provision violated the
Equal Protection Clause, was an example of one of these successful
challenges.237 But Alabama quickly corrected the constitutional problem by
passing a statute defining which crimes are those of “moral turpitude.”238 In
addition, the Hunter holding was largely based on documents from the
Alabama Constitutional convention of 1901, during which the delegates
openly expressed racial animus and their racist reasoning behind the state’s
criminal disenfranchisement provision.239 Legislators who passed later
disenfranchisement laws, even if they were motived by racial bias, likely did
not make the same mistake.240 Racial bias is also notoriously difficult to
prove, as evidenced by challenges to other voting laws, with the Court
holding that disparate racial effect may “trail” the primary purpose of the law,
as long as there is no evidence that race was the motivation behind the law.241
232. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17–18 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
234. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 87.
235. See supra Part III.
236. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967)
(disenfranchisement laws are not bills of attainder nor cruel and unusual punishment); Hayden
v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (not violative
of the First Amendment); King v. City of Boston, No. Civ.A.04–10156–RWZ, 2004 WL
1070573 (D. Mass. May 13, 2004) (not ex post facto law).
237. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
238. ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(g) (2019).
239. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
240. See Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S.
Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1620 (2012) (“As Senator Mitch McConnell put it while
discussing laws that disenfranchise felons, ‘states have a significant interest in reserving the
vote for those who have abided by the social contract that forms the foundation of
representative democracy . . . those who break our laws should not dilute the votes of lawabiding citizens.’”).
241. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999) (“Outright admissions of
impermissible racial motivation are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other
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This is a high bar to clear. Opponents of criminal disenfranchisement laws
have also tried other avenues, including the Eighth Amendment and other
sections of the Fourteenth Amendment besides the Equal Protection
Clause.242
Challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws under the Eighth
Amendment face two hurdles: the plaintiff must first prove that
disenfranchisement is truly a form of “punishment” under the amendment
and second, that this punishment is considered cruel and unusual under
“evolving standards of decency.”243 Most recent challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement laws have failed on the first prong.244 Notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to vote as central to guarding all
other rights,245 lower courts typically find that state disenfranchisement laws
are “nonpenal exercise[s] of the right to regulate the franchise.”246 Further
complicating the first prong of the test are the various “civil” justifications
for disenfranchisement laws.247 These civil justifications include the socialcontract and less-trustworthy rationales that underlie support for criminal
disenfranchisement laws.248 Courts have pointed to these justifications as
evidence that disenfranchisement is properly thought of as a civil collateral
consequence, rather than a criminal punishment.249 Though many members
of the public may perceive disenfranchisement as part of the punishment for
a crime committed,250 the courts have been unwillingly to accept this view as
a legal argument.
evidence. Summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion, however, is
inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the
trier of fact.”).
242. See infra notes 244, 258. In the interest of length, this note will address primarily
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges as examples of the difficulties in bringing
federal challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws. However, the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments have not been the only source of these challenges by any means. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that Voting
Rights Act’s prohibition against voting qualifications that result in abridgment of right to vote
on account of race does not apply to criminal disenfranchisement provision); Hayden v. Pataki,
No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (holding that New
York criminal disenfranchisement provisions did not violate the First Amendment); Jones v.
Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d 979 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that Illinois constitutional provision
disenfranchising persons convicted of felonies did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment).
243. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (accepting interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment that would allow a court to consider what actions are cruel and unusual
based on what society at that point in time finds cruel and unusual).
244. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 99–100.
245. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964).
246. Trop, 356 U.S. at 97; see also Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 448 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000) (“Modern thought perceives disenfranchisement of convicted felons, not
as punishment, but rather as a ‘nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.’”
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 97)).
247. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 100.
248. See supra Section IV.A. See generally Wilkins, supra note 159, at 109–16.
249. Wilkins, supra note 159, at 109.
250. See supra Section IV.A.
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As to the second prong, opponents of disenfranchisement laws face
an additional high hurdle.251 While the majority of Eighth Amendment
litigation is focused on physical punishment or the death penalty,252 the
Supreme Court has used the Eighth Amendment to strike down nontraditional forms of punishments in three cases: Weems v. United States
(twelve years in chains while performing hard labor); Trop v. Dulles
(expatriation); and Robinson v. California (imprisonment for narcotics
addiction).253 However, as the Second Circuit explained in Green v. Board of
Elections, the Framers would not have considered criminal
disenfranchisement “cruel and unusual” when the Eighth Amendment was
ratified because nearly all felonies were punishable by a sentence of death in
eighteenth-century England.254 In addition, the “the great number of states
excluding felons from the franchise forbids a conclusion that this is a ‘cruel
and unusual punishment’ within the context of ‘evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”255 The widespread
adoption of state disenfranchisement laws tends to undercut any claim that
the practice is cruel and unusual.256
The Fourteenth Amendment has been a source of various types of
challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws, including challenges under
the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses.257
Once a state grants someone the right to vote, that right is protected by the
Constitution.258 And generally, state laws that restrict voting rights must
survive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.259 But in
Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court seemed to affirmatively authorize
251. See Amy Heath, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Denying Ex-Felons the Right to
Vote After Serving Their Sentences, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 327, 335–36 (2017).
252. Jeffrey D. Bukowski, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the
Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases Is Not
Beyond the Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419 (1995); see,
e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1947) (second attempt at
electrocution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (hanging); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (firing squad). In later cases, the constitutionality of the death sentence
itself was at issue. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
253. See Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R.6th § 7, at 31 (2006).
254. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967).
255. Id. at 451 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
256. Heath, supra note 251, at 337.
257. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (equal protection); Tex.
Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake, 511 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (due process); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (N.D. 1934) (privileges
and immunities as well as due process).
258. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (“We do not stop to
canvass the relation between voting and political expression. For it is enough to say that once
the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
259. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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the practice of denying persons convicted of crimes the right to vote based
on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court acknowledged
is a less-familiar portion of the Constitution.260 Richardson held that a state
law that disenfranchised persons convicted of felonies even after they had
completed their sentences and parole terms did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.261 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes the
apportionment of state representatives among the states and dictates that
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.262
In analyzing this less-familiar section, the Court first engaged in an
extensive review of the amendment’s legislative history.263 The Court relied
on the fact that, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, “29
States had provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or authorized
the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of
felonies or infamous crimes.”264 As part of the readmission process during
Reconstruction, states had to submit their state constitutions for
Congressional approval, and the Court found it particularly persuasive that
states had been readmitted to the Union with disenfranchisement provisions
written into their state constitutions.265 This historical evidence confirmed for
the Court that criminal disenfranchisement laws were not prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.266 Notably, the Court did not consider the possibility
that these provisions existed to allow states to continue to disenfranchise exConfederates, as discussed in Part I of this note.
The Richardson decision effectively closed the door on attacking
criminal disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection Clause unless

260. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 42.
261. Id. at 56.
262. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
263. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 42–52.
264. Id. at 48.
265. Id. at 48–49.
266. Id. at 53.
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the challenger can prove racial animus.267 Lower courts have relied on
Richardson’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment to foreclose
challenges to disenfranchisement laws on Due Process grounds as well.268
VI. STATE-CENTERED APPROACHES TO ENDING CRIMINAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
In the absence of a viable federal constitutional solution that will end
criminal disenfranchisement, advocates of re-enfranchisement should focus
on solutions at the state level. In states that already have somewhat
permissive processes for regaining voting rights upon release from prison,269
advocates should seek to relax these laws even further. Advocates should
pursue solutions that at least allow persons to have their voting rights restored
automatically upon release from prison. Conditioning restoration of rights
upon completion of any parole, probation, or payment of fees can set up an
inequitable system that prevents persons of modest means from regaining
their voting rights and reaping the collateral and rehabilitative benefits of
being re-enfranchised.270
A state-centered solution to the problem of disenfranchisement could
take several forms, including legislation, a state constitutional amendment,
litigation under the state constitution, or even executive action by the state’s
governor. Legislation and state constitutional amendments provide ideal
avenues because of their permanency and their ability to shift political
attitudes.271 In addition, state constitutional challenges have met with some
success in striking down disenfranchisement laws.272 However, the viability
of a state constitutional challenge necessarily depends on the language used
in the constitution.273 Finally, executive action by governors is the least
desirable path to restore voting rights because these orders are reversible by
a subsequent governor with different views on criminal
disenfranchisement.274 Executive action is also highly discretionary and can
lead to piecemeal and arbitrary restoration of rights.275

267. Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal
Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1588 (2012).
268. See, e.g., Tex. Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake,
511 F. Supp. 149 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
269. See supra notes 117–29 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 121–29 and accompanying text.
271. See infra Section VI.A.
272. See infra notes 328–41.
273. See infra notes 328–41.
274. See infra Section VI.C.
275. See infra Section VI.C.
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A. Legislation and State Constitutional Amendments: A Florida Case
Study
Legislation and state constitutional amendments are the most
desirable avenues toward re-enfranchisement. However, these avenues also
present unique challenges. First, drafters of these amendments and statutes
may be tempted to include carve-outs for certain types of crimes because the
drafters fear that the public will not support a law that restores the right to
vote to the “terrible few.”276 These carve-outs undercut the theoretical
arguments behind re-enfranchisement and dilute support from more
progressive groups who would likely vote for the measures otherwise.277
Second, drafters of state constitutional amendments must anticipate potential
challenges if the amendments pass and be as precise with the language of the
amendments as possible in order to guard them from future attacks.278
As support for re-enfranchisement laws has grown over the past few
years, several states have recently enacted or are currently considering
changes to their criminal disenfranchisement laws through legislation or state
constitutional amendments.279 As of this writing, roughly 130 bills on
criminal disenfranchisement are working their way through thirty state
legislatures.280 Florida’s recent experiment in re-enfranchisement has
attracted the most attention of these efforts.281 Voters in the state recently
passed a constitutional amendment that restored the right to vote to most
persons who had been disenfranchised due to a criminal conviction.282
However, the state legislature balked at implementing the amendment and
used its vague language to justify narrowing the number of persons who can
benefit from the amendment.283 Thus, Florida offers crucial lessons to
advocates seeking to change their state’s re-enfranchisement laws—both
about the effectiveness of a state-centered solution and how to craft such a
solution.284
Florida’s state constitution originally denied voting rights to all
persons convicted of felonies until they petitioned the state’s Executive
Clemency Board for restoration of their rights.285 The Clemency Board is
276. See Wright, supra note 16; see also infra note 302.
277. See Wright, supra note 16.
278. See infra notes 310–19 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Joi Dukes, Tennessee Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Restore Voting Rights
to Felons, WRCBTV (Jan. 16, 2019, 8:35 PM), http://www.wrcbtv.com/story/39803360/
tennessee-lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-restore-voting-rights-to-felons [https://perma.cc/
7MHH-CJM8]; Replogle & Licon, supra note 155.
280. Sydney Ember & Matt Stevens, Bernie Sanders Opens Space for Debate on Voting
Rights for Incarcerated People, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/27/us/politics/bernie-sanders-prison-voting.html [https://perma.cc/QC7H-GLJW].
281. See Replogle & Licon, supra note 155.
282. Id.
283. See infra notes 310–19.
284. See infra pp. 156–61.
285. Replogle & Licon, supra note 155.
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comprised of the state’s Governor, Attorney General, Chief Financial
Officer, and Commissioner of Agriculture.286 Until recently, an estimated
1.68 million Floridians remained disenfranchised, and as of March 2017 over
10,000 were still waiting for a hearing before the Clemency Board.287 The
Board conducted hearings on restoration of voting rights at an estimated rate
of fifty-two cases per quarter.288 In March 2017, nine plaintiffs who had been
denied restoration of their voting rights by the Board filed a class action in
federal court.289 The plaintiffs relied on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution to argue that the lack of any rules or
standards to guide the Board in making restoration decisions violated equal
protection principles and unduly burdened their right to vote.290 The plaintiffs
won a permanent injunction ordering the state of Florida to draft a new voting
rights restoration process,291 but the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
stayed the injunction in April 2018 in Hand v. Scott.292 Mirroring the
Richardson reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit held:
The Fourteenth Amendment expressly empowers the states
to abridge a convicted felon’s right to vote. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 2. Binding precedent holds that the Governor
has broad discretion to grant and deny clemency, even when
the applicable regime lacks any standards. And although a
reenfranchisement scheme could violate equal protection if
it had both the purpose and effect of invidious
discrimination, appellees have not alleged—let alone
established as undisputed facts—that Florida’s scheme has a
discriminatory purpose or effect.293
In the meantime, a nonprofit called Second Chances Florida
circulated a petition that garnered enough signatures to place a proposed
amendment to the Florida Constitution on the November 2018 ballot.294 The
initiative grew out of a grassroots campaign called the Florida Rights
Restoration Coalition, which was started in 2014 by a group of formerly
286. Clemency, FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REVIEW, https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/
clemency.shtml (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9SFP-ABFJ].
287. Hand v. Scott: Florida Former Felon Voting Rights Restoration (Ongoing), FAIR
ELECTIONS LEGAL NETWORK, http://fairelectionsnetwork.com/hand-v-scott/ (last visited Aug.
14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8Y3Z-AR9G].
288. First Am. Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Hand v.
Scott, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00128-MW-CAS).
289. Id. at 2.
290. Id. at 60–66.
291. Order Directing Entry of J. at 21, Hand v. Scott, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (N.D. Fla.
2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00128-MW-CAS).
292. Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2018).
293. Id. at 1207.
294. Who We Are, SECOND CHANCES FLA., https://secondchancesfl.org/about/who-weare/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4X2L-R2NY].
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convicted persons.295 The amendment, called the Voting Restoration
Amendment, proposed to amend Article IV, Section 4 of the Florida
Constitution to read as follows:
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or
any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified
to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or
removal of disability. Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, any disqualification from voting arising from
a felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be
restored upon completion of all terms of sentence including
parole or probation.
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense
shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil rights.296
The proposed amendment garnered nationwide support, including support
from prominent progressive organizations—like United We Dream and the
Southern Poverty Law Center—in the form of publicity and calls for
volunteers to phone-bank or door-knock in support of the amendment.297
However, the amendment also drew criticism from other progressive
organizations like the Human Rights Defense Center because it excluded
persons convicted of murder or sexual offenses from regaining the right to
vote. 298 Critics of the amendment charged that
[i]f Amendment 4 passes it will enshrine into Florida’s
constitution discrimination against convicted murderers and
sex offenders that will make enfranchising them virtually
impossible. While some may point to the serious nature of
their offenses, those offenses have nothing to do with voting;
the punishment of disenfranchisement does not fit the
crime.299
This conflict illustrates one of the problems inherent in trying to end
criminal disenfranchisement through political means. To make the measure
more palatable to voters, advocates may be tempted to exclude those
convicted of certain crimes. As discussed above, disenfranchisement does
295. Id.
296. Voting
Restoration
Amendment,
SECOND CHANCES FLA.,
https://
secondchancesfl.org/about/voting-restoration-amendment/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/6SGQ-EP3R] (emphasis omitted).
297. E-mail from Southern Poverty Law Center, to author (Oct. 16, 2018, 18:29 CST)
(on file with author); E-mail from United We Dream Action to author (Oct. 6, 2018, 15:52
CST) (on file with author).
298. Wright, supra note 16.
299. Id.
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not further appropriate goals of either rehabilitation or retribution and may
even increase the likelihood of recidivism.300 In addition, it is not
constitutionally defensible to prevent persons from voting out of fear of how
they will vote.301 So it is unclear, from a logical and legal standpoint, why a
person convicted of murder or a sexual offense should be disenfranchised
while others are not. However, it is clear from an emotional and political
standpoint that a re-enfranchisement law may be more palatable to voters or
legislators if it includes a carve-out for “the terrible few.”302
The issue of palatability and “the terrible few” was illustrated in a
Democratic townhall, broadcast in April 2019, when Senator Bernie Sanders
was questioned about his support of voting rights for incarcerated persons.303
An audience member asked the senator, “Does this mean you would support
enfranchising people like the Boston Marathon Bomber, a convicted terrorist
and murderer?”304 Senator Sanders responded in part, “I think the right to
vote is inherent to our democracy. Yes, even for terrible people.”305 After the
audience applauded the senator’s answer, CNN’s Chris Cuomo pushed back:
“You’re writing an opposition ad against you by saying you think the Boston
Marathon Bomber should vote . . . . Are you sure about that?”306 Senator
Sanders confirmed his answer, which set off a wave of further discussion and
op-eds criticizing his position.307
300. See supra Part IV.
301. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
302. See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 15 (Earl Lewis et al. eds., 2007) (“The ‘terrible few’
are a statistically insignificant and socially unpredictable handful of the planet’s humans
whose psychopathic actions are the stuff of folktales, tabloids (including the evening news
and reality television), and emergency legislation. When it comes to crime and prisons, the
few whose difference might horribly erupt stand in for the many whose difference is
emblazoned on surfaces of skin, documents, and maps—color, credo, citizenship,
communities, convictions.”).
303. Emily Larsen, Bernie Sanders Says Boston Bomber Should Be Able to Vote from
Prison, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 22, 2019, 10:17 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
news/bernie-sanders-says-boston-bomber-should-be-able-to-vote-from-prison
[https://perma.cc/2Z4F-TCFH].
304. GOP War Room, Bernie Sanders Says That He Would Let Boston Marathon Bomber
Vote from Jail, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
QMyrChsBG68 (footage from a CNN broadcast).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.; see, e.g., Rebecca Buck, Cory Booker Swipes at Bernie Sanders over Restoring
Voting Rights for Felons in Prison, CNN: POLITICS (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:47 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/cory-booker-bernie-sanders-felons-voting-rights/
index.html [https://perma.cc/MA7Q-EZBZ]; Ellie French, Bernie Sanders Set Off a Firestorm
over Prisoners Voting, but His Facts Are Straight, POLITIFACT (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:27 PM),
https://www.politifact.com/vermont/statements/2019/apr/24/bernie-sanders/sanders-setfirestorm-over-prisoners-voting-his-fa/ [https://perma.cc/4SRH-6NG9]; Sen. Sanders Faces
Backlash for Saying Convicted Felons Have Right to Vote, CBS BOS. (April 23, 2019,
11:10 PM), https://boston.cbslocal.com/2019/04/23/bernie-sanders-backlash-felons-votingright-marathon-bomber/ [https://perma.cc/BUG7-E9G3].
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This controversy illuminates what drafters of laws like Florida’s
Amendment 4 were likely afraid of—that the public will not support a law
offering a benefit to a small number of persons who have committed
especially heinous crimes. In reality, including carve-outs for “the terrible
few” in re-enfranchisement laws undermines many of the theoretical
arguments in favor of re-enfranchisement.308 However, some advocates may
feel that carve-outs are a necessary practical reality in order to pass any kind
of re-enfranchisement legislation. Ultimately, Amendment 4 passed in
November of 2018 with almost sixty-five percent of Florida voters in favor
of passage.309
After the amendment’s passage, some Florida officials insisted that
the amendment required an implementing statute and would not take effect
until the legislature passed one.310 The Florida Constitution specifies that new
amendments take effect “on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
January following the election,” unless the amendment language specifies
otherwise.311 Accordingly, some county election commission officials began
accepting voter registrations from persons who regained their right to vote
under the amendment in January of 2019.312 But other legislative hurdles
soon appeared as lawmakers argued over the meaning of vague terms in the
amendment, including “murder,” “felony sexual offense,” and completion of
“all terms” of a person’s sentence.313 In April 2019, the Florida legislature
passed a bill that would require persons to pay all fines, fees, and restitution
before regaining their voting rights under the “all terms” clause.314 To justify
the bill, legislators “pointed to testimony by a lawyer for Amendment 4
before the Supreme Court and information on the Florida Rights Restoration
Coalition’s website that states that ‘all terms of sentence’ includes all court

308. See supra Part IV.
309. November 6, 2018 General Election Official Results—Constitutional Amendment,
FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, https://floridaelectionwatch.gov/Amendments (last visited Aug. 14,
2019) [https://perma.cc/JWF5-NTUJ].
310. Replogle & Licon, supra note 155 (“It is still not clear how [new] registrations will
be treated in the state capitol. Gov. Ron DeSantis said on Monday that he believes the
Legislature still needs to pass an implementing bill spelling out the [voting rights] restoration
process.”).
311. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e).
312. Langston Taylor, Amendment 4 Is Happening: Ex-Felons Can Register to Vote
Tuesday, TAMPA BAY TIMES: THE BUZZ (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2019/01/04/amendment-4-is-happening-ex-felons-can-register-to-vote-tuesday/
[https://perma.cc/WNV3-MM3Q].
313. Dara Kam, Amendment 4: Florida Senate Moves Away from Stricter Provisions on
Ex-Felon Voting, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 9, 2019, 11:20 AM), https://
www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-amendment-4-senate-changes-20190409-story.html
[https://perma.cc/M8BE-WVR3].
314. Lawrence Mower, Florida Legislature Approves Amendment 4 Bill That Creates
Hurdles for Voting Felons, TAMPA BAY TIMES: THE BUZZ (May 3, 2019),
https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/05/03/florida-legislature-approvesamendment-4-bill-that-creates-hurdles-for-voting-felons/ [https://perma.cc/TY8C-ZCXB].
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fees, fines and restitution.”315 Opponents of the bill decried it as new form of
poll tax and pointed out that requiring full restitution will add significant
delays to the restoration of rights because the state does not have a system to
track restitution payments.316 Desmond Meade, the chief architect of the
amendment, indicated that he would ask Florida Governor Ron DeSantis to
veto the bill.317 However, the governor signed the bill into law during the
summer of 2019.318 In response, more than a dozen persons with felony
convictions promptly sued in federal court.319
Florida’s passage of Amendment 4 and the subsequent legislative
struggle offer a pair of important lessons to advocates of re-enfranchisement.
The first lesson is that political challenges to disenfranchisement—in the
form of state constitutional amendments or legislation—are often more
fruitful than challenges in the federal court system. Examples of successful
federal court challenges to state disenfranchisement laws are few and far
between.320 However, political challenges to these laws remain viable and
can usually happen quicker than protracted legislation. For example,
Florida’s passage of Amendment 4 may have effectively mooted the Hand v.
Scott lawsuit regarding disenfranchisement that had been pending for almost
two years.321 Political challenges have the added benefit of demonstrating
popular support for persons with criminal convictions regaining their rights
to vote and help to dispel narratives about the general public wanting the law
to be tougher on criminals.322 Amendment 4 passed with almost sixty-five
percent of the vote and has enjoyed widespread support across the nation.323
Its passage also inspired other state legislators to consider similar changes in
their states.324 Advocates for re-enfranchising persons with criminal
315. Id.
316. Noreen Marcus, Amendment 4 in Florida Yields Voting Rights and Confusion, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 11, 2019, 9:38 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2019-04-11/amendment-4-in-florida-restores-voting-rights-and-confusion
[https://perma.cc/RRD6-DD3D].
317. Mower, supra note 314.
318. Lawrence Mower, What Now? Amendment 4, Felon Voting Move to Florida Courts,
TAMPA BAY TIMES: THE BUZZ (July 2, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2019/07/01/what-now-amendment-4-felon-voting-moves-to-the-courts/
[https://perma.cc/2H4W-GDBR].
319. Id. As of this writing, the lawsuit is still pending.
320. See Heath, supra note 251, at 334–37.
321. News Service of Florida, Court Battle over Felon Rights Could End, FLAPOL (Dec.
24, 2018), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/284100-court-battle-over-felon-rights-couldend [https://perma.cc/6HWS-KYV9].
322. See generally KAREN GELB, SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MYTHS AND
MISCONCEPTIONS: PUBLIC OPINION VERSUS PUBLIC JUDGMENT ABOUT SENTENCING (2006),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/publications/myths-and-misconceptions-publicopinion-versus-public-judgment-about-sentencing [https://perma.cc/2T2Z-S5C3].
323. See supra notes 297, 309.
324. Jon Kamp, Push to Give Felons the Vote Shifts to Iowa and Kentucky, WALL STREET
J. (Jan. 23, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/push-to-give-felons-the-voteshifts-to-iowa-and-kentucky-11548259251 [https://perma.cc/UFN7-DSDU].
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convictions can capitalize on the momentum of recent political changes to
disenfranchisement laws to argue that their states should join the reform
effort rather than waiting for sweeping, yet unlikely, reform to be handed
down from the federal courts.325
However, the second lesson to be gleaned from Amendment 4 is that
state legislators may resist re-enfranchisement provisions if they are passed
as ballot initiatives.326 Advocates must be careful in drafting state
constitutional amendments so that the purpose of the amendment is not
undercut by later legislation. Vague language included in the amendment and
even extraneous statements made by supporters of the amendment can be
used later to undermine the amendment’s purpose.327 Advocates in other
states should take note of the success of Florida’s state-centered solution and
also be wary of the potential pitfalls.
B. State Constitutional Challenges
Another path to ending criminal disenfranchisement that holds more
promise than federal litigation, though perhaps not as much as political
change, is state constitutional challenges.328 The federal constitution does not
explicitly guarantee a right to vote,329 but every state constitution either
explicitly or implicitly guarantees the right.330 Therefore, advocates of reenfranchisement may be able to use their state constitutions to challenge
disenfranchisement laws entirely or at least to limit their scope, depending
on the constitutional language.331 For example, in Mixon v. Commonwealth,
the plaintiffs challenged Pennsylvania statutes that barred incarcerated
persons from voting absentee and released persons from registering to vote
for five years after release.332 The plaintiffs argued these laws were
unconstitutional under various provisions of the state’s constitution,
including its Free and Equal Elections Clause.333 While the Pennsylvania
appellate court held (and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed) that
disenfranchising incarcerated persons did not violate the state’s constitution,
the court also held that the statute requiring released persons to wait five
325. See Stephen Spiker, Virginia Needs to Join the Rest of the Nation and End Felony
Disenfranchisement, BEARING DRIFT (Jan. 17, 2019), https://bearingdrift.com/2019/01/
17/virginia-needs-to-join-the-rest-of-the-nation-and-end-felony-disenfranchisement/
[https://perma.cc/29Q8-ZS3L].
326. See Mower, supra note 314.
327. Id.
328. See Miller, supra note 253, at § 26.
329. See Uggen & Manza, supra note 39, at 780.
330. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2; MD. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1;
TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (explicit); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 21 (implicit).
331. See, e.g., Crothers v. Jones, 120 So. 2d 248 (La. 1960); Mixon v. Commonwealth,
759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d without opinion, 783 A.2d 763 (2001).
332. Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445.
333. Id. at 445–47.
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years before registering to vote failed even rational basis scrutiny.334 Because
the law only barred registration for five years after release, it disenfranchised
those who were not registered prior to incarceration but had no effect on those
who registered before their incarceration.335 Pointing out several of the
rationale problems with criminal disenfranchisement discussed in part IV of
this note, the court wrote:
We can conceive of no rationale for permitting those who
were registered previous to incarceration to vote on their
release, while those who were not previously registered,
cannot. Such a statute has the appearance of penalizing exincarcerated felons for their status. Moreover, implicit in a
presumption that an unregistered individual who commits a
crime, and is punished therefor, remains civilly corrupt for
five years following release, is the unwarranted assumption
that there was no possibility of rehabilitation during that
period of incarceration and for five years thereafter. There is
nothing of which we are aware to support this logic and
underpin the implication that, after five years have elapsed
following a convicted felon’s release from confinement, that
individual has magically acquired the wherewithal to be a
responsible, qualified elector. We therefore conclude that
the prohibition against registration for five years after
release from confinement is constitutionally infirm.336
Though the court did not rely on specific language from the state constitution
in striking down the law, the state constitutional provisions provided the
vehicle for the successful challenge to one of the disenfranchisement laws.337
In other states, constitutional language has been used to reduce the
impact of state disenfranchisement laws.338 For example, in Crothers v.
Jones, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a state statute
disenfranchising persons “convicted of any crime, either in any of the courts
of Louisiana or in any of the courts of the United States, which may be
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,” violated the state
constitution, which limited disenfranchisement to persons convicted by
Louisiana courts.339 And in Gaskin v. Collins, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that a state statute expanding the definition of “infamous crime” was
unconstitutional as applied to a person convicted of manufacturing marijuana
334. Id. at 451.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 451–52.
337. See id. at 445–46.
338. See, e.g., Crothers v. Jones, 120 So. 2d 248 (La. 1960); Gaskin v. Collins, 661
S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1983).
339. Crothers, 120 So. 2d at 256.
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when that crime had not been defined as infamous at the time of
conviction.340
However, state constitutional challenges are still a limited solution
to the problem of disenfranchisement because they depend entirely upon the
language used in the constitution. In addition, some state constitutions
expressly grant the legislature the power to disenfranchise convicted
persons.341 Therefore, advocates of re-enfranchisement should carefully
consider the language in their state constitutions to discern if a challenge is
viable, either as a way to limit the scope of disenfranchisement laws or
invalidate them altogether.
C. Executive Action
Finally, advocates of re-enfranchisement may lobby their state
governors to sign executive orders that restore voting rights. For example, in
April 2018, New York governor Andrew Cuomo signed an executive order
that appeared to restore voting rights to parolees.342 However, the executive
order actually requires the Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision to send the governor’s office a monthly list of persons currently
released on parole for a case-by-case consideration of whether their voting
rights should be restored.343 This may have been an attempt to avoid the fate
of then-Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe’s executive order on felon
disenfranchisement, which was struck down by the state’s supreme court as
a violation of the state constitution.344 Unfortunately, the structure of
Governor Cuomo’s executive order makes it unclear whether the order
actually secures re-enfranchisement of all parolees in the absence of
legislative action.345 These recent executive actions regarding reenfranchisement demonstrate the common pitfalls of this strategy. Executive
orders are vulnerable to challenges as an improper exercise of authority,346
are reversible by subsequent governors,347 and may be granted on an
arbitrary, piecemeal basis.348 Governors may also be reluctant to pursue
executive action on this issue since doing so may expose a sitting governor

340. Gaskin, 661 S.W.2d at 867–68.
341. See Behrens, supra note 62, at 563.
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to attacks from political opponents.349 However, in a state where the
legislature is unwilling to consider a re-enfranchisement law, the state
constitution does not offer any helpful language, and a ballot initiative is
impossible or unlikely to succeed, executive action may be the only path
toward re-enfranchising more persons. In such cases, advocating for
executive action may still be a better path than pursuing federal litigation,
which is almost certain to fail under current precedent.350
CONCLUSION
The rationales underlying criminal disenfranchisement laws are no
longer supportable.351 There is no constitutional justification for preventing
a person from voting the “wrong” way,352 and disenfranchisement makes
little sense as a form of punishment for a crime because it is almost always
unconnected to the underlying offense.353 Disenfranchisement communicates
to a person that they are no longer welcome in or accepted by the rest of
society and can have far-reaching collateral consequences, such as barring a
person from jury service and participation in other forms of civic life.354 Reenfranchisement is linked to better outcomes in rehabilitation and encourages
a person released from prison to reintegrate into society through participation
in the democratic process.355 Therefore, advocates should push for laws that
at least automatically restore voting rights upon release from prison and are
not conditioned on payment of fines and fees or on the offense committed.356
Advocates of re-enfranchisement have frequently sought recourse
through the federal courts, but these courts are unlikely to strike down
disenfranchisement laws.357 Thus, advocates should concentrate their efforts
on changing state laws through legislation or amendments to their state
constitutions.358 Though it may be tempting to compromise to make the law
or amendment more politically palatable, broader re-enfranchisement laws
are ultimately more consistent with the goals of rehabilitation.359 If legislative
change by statute, constitutional amendment, or ballot initiative is not
possible in a certain state, advocates may turn to state constitutional
challenges or executive action until such a time as broader and more
349. See, e.g., Jimmy Vielkind, Republicans Attack Cuomo’s Plan to Restore Felons’
Voting Rights, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 2, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
republicans-attack-cuomos-plan-to-restore-felons-voting-rights-1538520147
[https://perma.cc/7BNE-X5TY].
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356. See supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text.
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358. See supra Part VI.
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permanent change is possible.360 No matter which state-centered solution
advocates of re-enfranchisement pursue, they must carefully craft the
solution to preserve its spirit against future legislative or political attacks.361

360. See supra Sections VI.B–C.
361. See supra Section VI.A.

